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NOTES
The Doctrine of Libel Per Se in Ohio
INTRODUCTION
Few areas of Ohio law have been so beset by confusion and conflict-
ing decisions as the area of the law of defamation referred to as libel
per se. This confusion is the more regrettable for it tends to obscure and
obstruct the effective operation of defamation law. Defamation is a
"relational tort," protecting one's interest in his reputation - which is
the foundation of his relations with others - against those utterances
which come within the definition of defamation.1
A good reputation has long been regarded a most precious asset.
Shakespeare expressed the feelings of many when he said: "who steals
my purse steals trash.... But he who filches from me my good name...
makes me poor indeed."2
2 Historically, words which held a person up to "hatred, ridicule or contempt" were
deemed defamatory. The modern view holds words defamatory which "harm the
reputation of another as to lower him in the esteem of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him." RESTATEMENT, TORTS S 559
(1938); see PROSSER, TORTS 574 (2d ed. 1955). Modern courts have tended to
adopt the spirit of the modern definition, while retaining the patter of "hatred,
ridicule or contempt." e.g. Burrell v. Moran, 38 Ohio Op. 185, 82 N.E. 2d 334
(C.P. 1948).
'Othello, Act III, Sc. 3, line 131; cited in McCarthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 136
NE. 2d 393, 402 (Ohio App. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Understanding libel and libel per se as these doctrines now exist in
Ohio, necessitates understanding the development of these actions in the
common law courts.3
Slander, or spoken defamation, was originally recognized in the ec-
clesiastical courts and treated as a "sin." The action of libel, or written
defamation, was at first administered by the Court of Star Chamber as
a criminal action, often being used to suppress adverse opinion. When
the common law courts took over jurisdiction of spoken defamation from
the ecclesiastical courts, they interjected legalistic notions and required
"temporal" or pecuniary damages as a pre-requisite to the maintenance
of the action of slander, except for imputations in three categories. Oral
imputations within these categories were actionable without the showing
of actual damage, for damage was presumed from the more serious nature
of the charges. These categories were: (1) the imputation of a serious
crime; 4 (2) the imputation of certain loathsome diseases;5 and (3) im-
putations adversely affecting the plaintiff in his business, trade or pro-
fession."
When the common law courts took over the jurisdiction of libel, or
written defamation, from the Star Chamber, they continued the latter's
custom of holding written defamation actionable without proof of actual
or "temporal" damage. This carry over may have been the result of the
common law courts' adopting the concept of the Roman criminal law -
'Excellent accounts of the historical background of these actions are found in:
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 568, comment b (1938); Developments in the Law -
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 572 (2d ed. 1955);
Note, 33 CHI-KENT L. REv. 313 (1955).
'The Ohio courts have limited this category rather strictly. In the following cases,
slander per se was found to exist under the "serious crimes" category: Schoedler v.
Gauge and Equip. Co., 134 Ohio St. 78, 15 N.E. 2d 958 (1938) ("embezzlement");
Zehring v. Zehring, 25 Iddings T.R.D. (Ohio C.P. 1899) ("thief"). The follow-
ing cases held the particular imputation not within this category: Davis v. Brown,
27 Ohio St. 326 (1875) (charging man with sodomy); Hollingsworth v. Shaw,
19 Ohio St. 430 (1869) ("military desertion"); Pecyk v. Semoncheck, 61 Ohio L.
Abs. 465, 105 N.E. 2d 61 (Ct. App. 1952) ("communist"); Byers v. Forest, 4
Ohio Dec. Reprint 458, 2 Cleve. L. Rep. 194 (C.P. 1879) ("blackmailer"); Mc-
Kean v. Folden, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 248, 2 West. L. Mo. 146 (C.P. 1859)
("bestiality"). See also Dial v. Holter, 6 Ohio St. 228, 241 (1856) ("the in-
famy of the offense . . . constitutes the test").
'Kaucher v. Blinn, 29 Ohio St. 62 (1875) ("venereal disease").
'Hayner v. Cowden, 27 Ohio St. 292 (1875) (charging a clergyman with drunk-
enness). A fourth category has been recognized in Ohio and in many other juris-
dictions encompassing charges of lack of chastity made to a woman: Malone v.
Stewart, 15 Ohio 319 (1846); Helferich v. Taebel, 15 Ohio Dec. 396, 2 Ohio
L. Rep. 359 (C.P. 1904). See also PROSSER, TORTS 592 (2d ed. 1955).
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which looked only to "reputational harm ' 7  It also may have been that
the action of libel, which had been treated as a crime in the Star Cham-
ber "was already established as the greater wrong" and "greater respon-
sibility continued to be attached to it."8 In any case, the adoption of the
rule was probably related to "the reverence of an illiterate nation for the
printed word '9
Whatever the original basis for establishing the distinction as to the
actionable nature of the written and the spoken word, the courts' decisions
have uniformly rationalized the distinction on the grounds that:
In libel, the written or printed words are of necessity attended with
more deliberation and coolness and hence are indicative of stronger malice
than oral words, in addition to being embodied in a more permanent and
enduring form and therefore calculated to do greater wrong and much
more harm... (because of) ... the opportunity it affords for disseminat-
ing the injurious matter. '
This justification and rationale was denounced by Lord Mansfield as
early as 1812.11 The indication of stronger malice is a "poor argument
where liability does not rest on any intent to defame,"' 2 and liability is es-
tablished by merely showing the unprivileged publication.-$ By the ap-
plication of this distinction of form rather than substance, a plaintiff
might recover for a written imputation read by a scant few persons, while
another plaintiff might go remediless unless he could prove actual dam-
ages, when the same charge was made orally within the hearing of a large
crowd. The attack upon the absurdities of the "written-spoken" dichot-
omy has been spurred by the conflicting and anomalous decisions that
have resulted from the attempts of the courts to apply the antiquated
concepts of libel and slander to the mass media of radio and television.
It has been held that radio defamation constitutes publication of a libel; 14
that such defamation is to be treated as slander;15 and it has been pro-
"De Libellis Famosis, 5 Co. Rep. 125; 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (Star Ch. 1605); see
Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1956).
8PaossER, TORTS 585 (2d ed. 1955).
9 lbid.
2025 Omo JuR., Libel, § 4 (1932); accord, Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531 (1834);
G.M. McKelvey Co. v. Nanson, 5 Ohio App. 73 (1915); Tappmeyer v. Journal-
Republican Co., 22 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 337 (C.P. 1920).
'Thorley v. Lord Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (Eng. C.P. 1812).
12PRosstR, TORTs 595 (2d ed. 1955).
1Id. at 572; see Tribune Publishing Co. v. Blossom, 134 Iddings T.R.D. (Ohio
C.P. 1899).
'Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932). The English Defama-
tion Act of 1952, 15 & 16 GEo. 6 & 1 ELiZ. 2, c.66, cl. 1-2, establishes as libel
all radio defamations.
'Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., (1932) Vic. L. Rep. 425.
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posed that it is one or the other, depending on whether the speaker was
reading from a script.16
The incredible judicial inertia which has perpetuated this distinction
can be explained, at least in part, by the fact that there is considerable
conflict as to what path the courts should follow in recasting the law of
defamation.' 7 Many advocate a remedy of retraction, contending that
"the damage remedy is ... encumbered by technicalities,"' 8 while other
observers have espoused a fundamental change in the damage remedy. 9
Perhaps the most radical change actually made was in the adoption of a
Uniform Defamation Act in two Canadian provinces. This Act abolishes
the distinction between libel and slander and makes all defamatory pub-
lications actionable without proof of actual damages.2
LIBEL PER SE
The law of defamation was further separated from reality and trans-
ported even more deeply into a morass of doctrinaire rules by the ap-
pearance of the "step-child" of libel - libel per se. Originally, all libelous
publications were actionable without proof of actual damage.21 The early
common law courts did employ a rule of pleading which distinguished be-
tween two classes of libel, which were labeled libel per se and libel per
quaod. Libel per se described those statements which were defamatory
"on their face," while libel per quaod described those charges which were
not defamatory "on their face," but became so only by reference to ex-
trinsic facts. 22
Under this rule of pleading, a written charge of communist member-
ship today would be defamatory "on its face." To charge one with mem-
"aHartmann v. Winchell, 286 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30 (1947). See RESTATE-
MENT, TORTs § 568, comment f (1938); annot., 5 A.L.R. 2d 957 (1949). Some
support is found in recent decisions for treating radio defamation as a new tort,
distinct from both libel and slander. In this connection, see Summit Hotel Co. v.
National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 302 (1939); Kelly v. Hoffman,
137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A. 2d 143 (1948).
1TPROSSER, TORTS 595 (2d ed. 1955).
" Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423 (1952). The Ar-
kansas Lie Bill is discussed as a means of retraction. See also Note, 33 CHI-KENT
L. REv. 313 (1955).
"Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1956). This
proposal would distinguish between negligent and intentional defamations and in
the former, base presumptions of damage on the foreseeability thereof.
"
mMan. c. 11 (Manitoba 1946); Abta. c. 14 (Alberta 1947). For a criticism of
this Act and a rare approval of the "written-spoken" dichotomy in defamation, see
Note, 34 MARQ. L. REv. 31 (1949).
'
1See notes 7 and 8 supra.
"Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1956); Note,
17 So. CALIF. L. REv. 347 (1944).
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bership in the XYZ League would not be defamatory "on its face." If,
however, the person could show by "inducement '23 that this organization
was known to be a communistic group and by "innuendo"24 that this
charge conveyed the meaning that the person was a communist, he could
plead and recover under the category of libel per quod, without any proof
of actual damage.
Unfortunately, two meanings of "per se" thus existed within the con-
fines of the law of defamation. Slander per se indicated spoken charges
which were actionable without proof of actual damage. Libel per se in-
dicated a statement which was in written form and was defamatory "on
its face." Through a process of conscious or unconscious transposition,
many courts began to re-define libel per se in terms of being actionable
without proof of actual damage. A rule of pleading became a substantive
rule, with the courts declaring that "words ... which require an innuendo
to give ... a libelous meaning ... require evidence to show ... some
substantial injury."25  Some courts came to hold that the use of an in-
nuendo established the -need therefor and thus proof of actual damage
was required. This was because:
... the very fact that the plaintiff pleads and relies upon the innuendo
set out in his petition ... refutes the idea that the language is libelous,
per se.
Through the avenue of "shifting-meanings," many courts thus divided
the action of libel into two substantive entities - "per se" and "per
quod." With the door to change and "progress" ajar, courts began to
utilize the powerful semantic tool of "shifting-meanings" to further con-
fuse this area. Adopting the view that there exists two substantive classes
of libel - "per se" and "per quod" - and that only the former is action-
able without proof of actual damage, these courts proceeded to re-define
these already re-defined concepts and distinguished the two classes on
grounds other than the necessity of reference to extrinsic facts to show
the defamatory nature of the particular statementar
Some courts have implied that the categories of libel per se and slan-
" PRossER, ToRTs 582 (2d ed. 1955).
" Ibid. 'The Function of the innuendo is to explain the words in light of the facts."
'Brewer v. Hearst Publishing Co., 185 F. 2d. 846 (7th Cir. 1950); accord, Land-
strom v. Thorpe, 189 F. 2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951); Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., v.
Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932); Bennett v. Seimiller,
175 Kan. 764, 267 P. 2d 926 (1954).
'Kee v. Armstrong, Byrd & Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 P. 494 (1919).
'See Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 875 (1956);
Note, 17 So. CALIF. L. REV. 347 (1944).
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der per se are identical 28 At least one Ohio case has adopted this view?9
Other courts have held that a written statement is libelous per se only
when the court can rule as a matter of law that the plaintiff's reputation
has been injured.30 In some jurisdictions, the seriousness of the charge
has been stated to be the distinction separating these categories.31
LIBEL Pm SE IN OHIO - A SEMANIC RIDDLE
The distinction between written and spoken defamation has long
been recognized in Ohio32 and in this state "a dear distinction exists be-
tween them in respect of their actionable character."33  The distinction
is justified on the ground 4 that written defamation is "embodied in a
more permanent ... form" and it is "indicative of stronger malice."35
The Ohio courts have also adopted the substantive concept of libel
per se - the "misbegotten monster" of the courts,36 and have uniformly
declared libel per se to be that segment of written defamation which is
actionable without proof of actual damage. Whether a particular written
imputation constitutes libel per se has been the point of conflict and
confusion.
This confusion resulted from the presence, in the Ohio decisions, of
two different tests or "meanings" of libel per se. One test, which may
be labeled the "seriousness of the accusation" test, defined libel per se as
encompassing all serious written defamations, whether apparent "on the
face" of the publication or through extrinsic facts. The second test held
libel per se to include only those statements which were defamatory "on
their face." This latter test will be referred to as the "dearness of the
accusation" test.
THE "SERIOUSNESS OF THE ACCUSATION" TEST
The "seriousness of the accusation" test looks to the gravity of the
imputation, whether it is "on the face" of the publication or becomes ap-
'Harrison v. Burger, 212 Ala. 670, 103 S. 842 (1925); Rachels v. Deener, 182
Ark. 931, 33 S.W. 2d 39 (1930).
"Hunt v. Meridian Printing Co., 17 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 293, afJ'd without opinion,
87 Ohio St. 522, 102 N.E. 1128 (1910).
' Babcock v. McClatchy Newspapers, 82 Cal. App. 2d 528, 186 P.2d 737 (1947).
"Bedekovich v. Hearst Corp., 141 N.Y.S. 2d 651 (Munc. 1955).
'Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531 (1834); Newbraugh v. Curry, Wright 47 (Ohio
1832); Lakin v. Gun, Wright 14 (Ohio 1831).
'State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30, 34 (1881).
See note 10 supra.
"G.M. McKelvey Co. v. Nanson, 5 Ohio App. 73, 74 (1915); accord, Watson v.
Trask, 6 Ohio 531 (1834); Tappmeyer v. Journal-Republican Co., 22 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 337 (C.P. 1920).
3Note, 17 So. CAuF. L. Rav. 347 (1944).
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parent only by reference to extrinsic facts. Therefore "the innuendo as
to the intended meaning is sufficient to charge a libel per se.. ."7 and
will allow a recovery without proof of actual damages.This emphasis on the seriousness of the charge is readily seen in the
language of the case of Watson v. Trask,88 the apparent "fountain-head"
of this test of libel per se:
Words of ridicule only, or of contempt, which merely tend to lessen a
man in public esteem, or to wound his feelings, will support a suit for
libel....
The majority of later cases have followed the lead of the Watson case,
emphasizing that if the tendency of the written words would be to lessen
societal esteem towards the person about whom they were written, they
are libelous per se.40 And this would be true even though the words
"may impute no moral turpitude to him.... ,,41
The language of the numerous cases2 which have utilized this
"seriousness" test seems to equate the requisite "seriousness" of the im-
putation with the standard definition of defamation 43 and to recite the
standard patter of "hatred, ridicule or contempt," while still speaking of
the need for "special damages to support an action for defamation, per
quod. '44  By requiring a showing of special damages except for a libel
per se, and then holding all written defamation to be libelous per se, these
Ohio courts have, by utilizing this test, applied the classic rule that all
libel is actionable without a showing of actual or special damage.
Several Ohio decisions have attempted to modify and make more
selective the "seriousness of the accusation" test, saying that:
'Tratnik v. Kalish, 5 Ohio App. 258, 260 (1915). Support for the view that the
Ohio courts have employed a dual test to determine the existence of libel per se is
found in Note, 15 OHIo ST. .J. 303 (1954).
M6 Ohio 531 (1834).
'Watson v. Trask, 6 Ohio 531, 533 (1834).
0 State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30, 34 (1881); SEE Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v.
Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 125, 95 N.E. 735, 737 (1911).
'Burrell v. Moran, 38 Ohio Op. 185, 186, 82 N.E. 2d 334, 335 (C.P. 1948).
a Culmer v. Canby, 101 Fed. 195 (6th Cir. 1900); Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Buckner,
98 Fed. 222 (6th Cir. 1899); Tappan v. Wilson, 7 Ohio 190 (1835); Ward v.
League for Justice, Inc., 93 N.E. 2d 723 (Ohio App.), dismissed for want of de-
batable question, 154 Ohio St. 367, 95 N.E. 2d 769 (1950); Peer v. Hoiles, 3 Ohio
L. Abs. 653 (Ct. App. 1925); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. Nanson, 5 Ohio App. 73
(1915); Grant v. Times Star Co., 9 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) (C.P. 619 1899); Kahn v.
Cincinnati Times-Star, 8 Ohio N.P. 616, 10 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 599 (C.P.), afi'd
without opinion, 52 Ohio St. 662, 44 N.E. 1132 (1895); Pugh v. Starbuck, 1 Ohio
Dec. Reprint 143, 2 West. UJ. 503 (C.P. 1845).
a One of the few decisions that accords this overt recognition is Burrell v. Moran,
38 Ohio Op. 185, 82 N.E. 2d 334 (C.P. 1948).
"Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584, (1941).
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.. even if printed and published, mere words of ridicule, which tend to
lessen a man in public esteem or to wound his feelings, are not always
actionable without proof of special damages ... (and) ... to come within
the rule permitting recovery, without proof of special damages, the words
of ridicule or contempt must relate to matters which are required either
by the moral code or the law of the land, liberally and not technically
construed... s
Under the asserted modification ... it is not libelous to charge a
man with doing that which he may lawfully do and which is not a viola-
tion of the moral code...."46
Under this modified "seriousness" test, a segment of written defama-
tion - those utterances which charge neither a violation of the criminal
code nor of the moral code - would be left to the action of libel per
quod. This modification of the aforementioned test, however, has re-
ceived relatively little attention from the Ohio courts and the vast ma-
jority of Ohio cases have followed the "seriousness" test unaffected by
this restriction.
By means of the undiluted "seriousness" test all written defamation
was held libelous per se, yet the Ohio courts applying this test still re-
ferred to an action labeled libel per quod, wherein actual damage was
requisite to the maintenance of the action.47  It seems that the courts
were here confusing libel per quod with the related tort of "Injurious
Falsehood,"48 and thereby adding further confusion to their decisions by
extending the process of "shifting-the-meanings." A non-defamatory
statement may be actionable as an "injurious falsehood" if it is an "un-
true and malicious charge" wherefrom "damage is shown to have resulted
as a natural and proximate consequence."4°
The Restatement of Torts5" has adopted the classic view of the action-
able naiure of libel and accordingly states that the ".... publication of any
libel is actionable per se, that is, irrespective of whether any special harm
has been caused to the plaintiff's reputation or otherwise."5' A number
'Holloway v. Scripps Publishing Co., 11 Ohio App. 226, 231 (1919); accord, Mc-
Carthy v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 136 N.E. 2d 393 (Ohio App. 1956); Sweeney v.
Beacon Journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d 471 (1941); Ohio
Public Service Co. v. Myers, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 374, 6 N.E. 2d 29 (Ct. App. 1934).
"Holloway v. Scripps Publishing Co., 11 Ohio App. 226, 233 (1919).
,7 See note 45 supra.
'PRoSSER, ToRTS 760 (2d ed. 1955).
"Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245
N.W. 231 (1932); see Bigelow v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N.E. 2d 584
(1941.)
60RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 569 (1934).
Id. at comment c.
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of recent cases in this country have expressly followed the Restatement
view and have held that ... any libel is actionable per se...
The Ohio courts that employed the "seriousness of the accusation"
test thus actually adopted the view of the Restatement, though this was
obscured by the courts non-admission of their equating of libel per se
with written defamation.
THE "CLEARNESS OF THE AccUSATION" TEST
The "dearness of the accusation" test is the result of the "shift in
meanings" which transposed a rule of pleading in libel actions into a
substantive classification.5 3  The adoption of this test for distinguishing
between libel per se and libel per quod results in written utterances being
actionable, per se (without proof of actual damage) only when they are
defamatory, per se (defamatory "on their face").
This test has been enunciated in the decisions of many jurisdictions,
which decisions have held that when the libelous nature of the imputa-
tion must be shown by innuendo, the plaintiff must plead and prove spe-
cial damages and a failure so to plead may be taken advantage of by
general demurrer.5 One court articulated the core of this test succinctly,
saying that:
.. words which are libelous, per se do not need an innuendo and con-
versely, words which need an innuendo are not libelous, per se."'
The "seriousness of the accusation" test has been most often utilized
in Ohio decisions, but the "dearness" test has occasionally crept into a
decision. Thus it was early held that:
... if the meaning is not clearly discoverable from... the text so that
innuendo ... is necessary... [it] would not be per se libelous.
With two tests existing among the Ohio decisions, hidden behind a
screen of "semantic uniformity," it was inevitable that confusion would
result within a single decision. In the case of Westropp v. E. V. Scripps
Co.,57 the Ohio Supreme Court displayed the results of this confusion in
'Preveden v. Croatian Fraternal Union of America, 98 F. Supp. 784 (W.D. Pa.
1951); Kindley v. Privette, 241 N.C. 140, 84 S.E. 2d 660 (1954).
'See note 25 supra.
r'Walker v. Tribune Co., 29 Fed. 827, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1887); see Brewer v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 185 F. 2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1950).
'Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245
N.W. 231 (1932); accord, Landstrom v. Thorpe, 189 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1951);
Bennett v. Seimiler, 175 Kan. 764, 267 P. 2d 926 (1954); Chase v. New
Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594 (1949); Kee v. Armstrong,
Byrd & Co., 75 Okla. 84, 182 P. 494 (1915).
t' Serdage v. Kampf, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 822 (C.P. 1899).
148 Ohio St. 365, 74 N.E.2d 340 (1947).
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a four to three decision. The majority opinion exemplified, in spirit
and language, the "seriousness of the accusation" test, emphasizing the
fact that the defendant had "charged that the plaintiff, as judge of the
Municipal Court... granted a continuance... motivated by ... politi-
cally powerful friends .. ." of the accused.58 The majority, however, felt
compelled to take cognizance of the "dearness" test and thus stated that
the innuendoes used by the plaintiff could be deleted "as surplusage."59
The dissent in the Westropp case emphasized the "dearness" test,
stating that when an innuendo is necessary to show the defamatory na-
ture of the publication, such publication cannot be libelous per se.60 The
fact that the plaintiff employed innuendoes, said the dissenters, was an
admission of the need therefor.61 As a result, continued the dissenters,
"the petition with its innuendoes, presented a deficient cause of action
for libel per quod" because "special damages constitute the sole basis of
recovery in an action per quod."'62
BECKER V. TOULMIN - A SPRINGBOARD TO WHAT?
In recent months, the Ohio Supreme Court was once more confronted
with the problem of libel per se in the case of Becker v. Toulmin.63 In
this case the plaintiff, Becker, had been employed by the defendant, but
had voluntarily left the defendant's employ to go into the same business
independently. Defendant sent telegrams to his customers with whom
the plaintiff had dealt while in the defendant's employ. These telegrams
read: "We have found it necessary to terminate employment our em-
ployee Walter Becker."
Plaintiff sued for libel, pleading through an innuendo that the mean-
ing conveyed by the statement was that plaintiff was discharged because
of some fault or incompetence on his part. The plaintiff did not plead
special damages. The trial court judge submitted the question of libel
per se to the jury and the resultant verdict was for the plaintiff.
The supreme court reversed the decision of the trial court and the
affirming decision of the appellate court and entered final judgment for
the defendant. The word "terminate" is a neutral word, said the court,
and since this was a question of libel per se (no special damages were
'Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 375, 74 NXE.2d 340, 345
(1947).
'Id. at 372, 74 N.E.2d at 344.
°
0 Id. at 380, 74 N.E.2d at 348.
a Ibid.
'Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 379, 74 N.E.2d 340, 347
(1947).
' 165 Ohio St. 549, 138 N.E.2d 391 (1956).
[December
NOTES
pleaded) reference could be had only to the "face" of the publication. On
that basis the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in the trial
court, for libel per se is a question for the court - not for the jury.
Apparently taking heed of the confusion which abounded in this
area and feeling an indication of direction was desperately needed, the
court, in a unanimous64 decision, thus utilized the Becker case as a spring-
board for establishing the "dearness of the accusation" test as the test for
libel per se. Without mentioning prior cases decided under the "serious-
ness" test and distinguishing the Westropp case on the ground that the
innuendoes used therein were "surplusage," the decision aligns Ohio with
those jurisdictions which have used the "shifting-meaning" device to
breathe substantive life into a former rule of pleading.
The Ohio Supreme Court, in the Becker case, sets out the axioms of
the "dearness" test:
Libel per se means libel of itself, or upon the face of a publication,
whereas libel per quod is libel by an interpretation, through an innu-
endo...."
If a publication is not libelous per se but only per quod, such publica-
tion is not actionable in the absence of proof of special damage to the
one claiming to be libeled.
By this ruling the court has, in the opinion of this writer, attributed
an improper meaning to the concept of libel per se. Unlike the "serious-
ness" test, the "dearness" test utilizes the nebulous "per se" doctrine to
move further away from the original law of libel which held all libels to
be actionable without proof of actual damage. The absurd result of this
test is to presume harm in the case of a statement defamatory "on its
face," but not to do so when the defamatory nature must be shown by
extrinsic facts. "Both injure reputation at the moment they are pub-
lished '67 and the harm is equal whether the defamation is "on the face"
of the publication or is apparent to the recipient because of the extrinsic
facts of which he knows.68
By adopting the "dearness" test, the Ohio court is, in effect, defeating
a great part of the social purpose of this tort action and vitiating the pro-
tection given to the interest of reputation. A large proportion of written
defamations is "covert" or defamatory only in reference to extrinsic facts.
The defamed person is now confronted with the obstacle of showing
"Made possible by the presence of three judges who were not on the court nine
years earlier, when the Westropp case was decided.
'Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 556, 138 N.E.2d 391, 397 (1956).
0 Ibid.
T17 So. CALIF. L. Riv. 347, 370 (1944).
'See Development in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARv. L. REv. 875 (1956);
Note, 17 Co. CALF. L. REV. 347 (1944).
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actual damage before he will be accorded a right of action in libel per
quod. These damages must be shown with specificity in such an action
and "... . if the plaintiff cannot give the names of those who have ceased
to deal with him... he must fail in his suit, although there has in fact
been a falling off in his business."69  Often the people whom the plain-
tiff must call to prove the effect of the defamatory publication will be
loath to state that the publication has affected their opinion of the plain-
tiff. As a result of the introduction of this distinction into the law of
defamation, the defamed individual will be further handicapped in his
attempts to secure redress through the courts.
With the potential adverse consequences of this decision apparent, it
seems appropriate to inquire as to what motivated the decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court. The adoption of the "dearness" test would tend to
indicate a desire on" the part of the Ohio court to establish a settled
"meaning" for libel per se and at the same time to limit the role of the
jury to an equal or greater extent than was obtained under the "serious-
ness" test. The utilization of the "seriousness" test aligned the Ohio
courts with the classic rule which held all libels to be actionable without
a showing of special damage - but shifted the bulk of the decision-mak-
ing from the jury to the court. Under the original rule it was:
... for the court in the first instance to determine whether the words are
reasonably capable of a particular interpretation; it is then for the jury to
say whether they were in fact so understood:'
Through the operation of the "seriousness" test which equated libel
per se with written defamation, the Ohio courts limited the role of the
jury by establishing the question of libel per se as one "for the court.17 1
As the "seriousness" test developed, however, many decisions began
to intimate that the jury still had some function in the determination of
the question of libel per se7" and ultimately the Westropp case stated
that:
... in an action for libel the question whether the publication complained
of is libelous, per se is primarily for the court and it is error to submit to
the jury the question whether the publication is libelous, per se, unless
'Shaw Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., v. Des Moines Dress Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245
N.W. 231 (1932).
7 PROSSER, TORTs 581 (2d ed. 1955).
'Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118, 95 N.E. 662
(1911); accord, Mauk v. Brundage, 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (1903); Peer v.
Hoiles, 3 Ohio L. Abs. 653 (Ct. App. 1925).
'State v. Smily, 37 Ohio St. 30 (1881); Cleveland Retail Grocers' Ass'n. v. Exton,
18 Ohio C.C.R. 321, 10 Ohio C.C. Dec. 145 (C.P. 1899); Kahn v. Cincinnati Times-
Star, 8 Ohio N.P. 616 (C.P.), ail'd without opinion, 52 Ohio St. 662, 44 N.E. 1132
(1890); Bishop v. Cincinnati Gazette Co., 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 711 (C.P. 1880).
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its meaning is so uncertain.., as to require that the... meaning be
submitted to the jury. (Emphasis supplied).r
When faced with the Becker case, the Ohio Supreme Court apparently
felt a clear-cut transition to the "dearness" test would be preferable to
further qualifications of the "seriousness" test and, at the same time,
would enable the court to re-establish as a settled nile that the question
of "whether words of a publication are libelous, per se is a question for
the court.' 7 4
CONCLUSION
The historical distinction between written and spoken defamation,
which makes substantive rights dependent upon form rather than sub-
stance, has been consistently criticized by the courts and by text writers
as "remnants of long forgotten jurisdictional conflicts. '7  The advent
of such mass media as radio and television may ultimately produce suf-
ficient pressure to overcome the judicial inertia which has enveloped and
perpetuated this area of tort law.
Until such time, the courts will best serve society by keeping the an-
tiquated and legalistic concepts of the law of defamation in as dose prox-
imity to reality and social purposefulness as is possible.
By utilizing the semantic tool of the "shifting-meaning" and thereby
interpreting libel per se so as to make only those written statements
defamatory "on their face" actionable without proof of actual damages,
the Ohio Supreme Court has established a distinction without basis in
logic or social benefit. It is to deny reality to contend that a statement
defamatory "on its face" will more certainly produce harm than another
statement, the defamatory nature of which is readily apparent to recipients
who have knowledge of extrinsic facts. By requiring specific actual dam-
age to be pleaded and proved in cases of libel per quaod - publications
defamatory only in reference to extrinsic facts - this distinction vitiates
the utility of this portion of tort law by denying relief to persons injured,
but unable to show damages with the requisite specificity.
By the unequivocal adoption of the "dearness" test for libel per se,
the Ohio Supreme Court provides only superficial clarity. Beneath the
glaze, this test will result in further separating the doctrines of the law
of defamation from reality and social utility.
GEORGE N. ARONOFF
"Westropp v. E.W. Scripps Co., 148 Ohio St. 365, 373, 74 N.E.2d 340, 345
(1947).
""Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 554 (1956). The court does admit that
the "definition" of a word "might be a jury question." Id. at 555.
UPRossER, TORTS 595 (2d ed. 1955).
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